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NOTES
authorized mistreatment, not serious enough to merit the charge of
being "cruel and unusual."
3. Refusal to release a prisoner who has completed serving a valid
sentence.
4. Improper transfer of the prisoner from one penal institution to
another.
5. Unwarranted revocation of parole, made without notice and
hearing.
6. Refusal to release one committed to an institution for the insane
who has regained his sanity.
I. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus is the most common device used by
prisoners seeking relief from after-trial deprivation of rights. How-
ever, the use of this ancient1 writ is immediately hindered by historic
rules governing its issuance which have grown old as the writ itself.
Habeas corpus was historically regarded as a method by which one
"illegally" or "unlawfully" restrained might be released.2 When de-
fining these terms, the courts concluded that an "illegal" or "unlawful"
restraint was one imposed pursuant to a void judgment; that is, render-
ed by a court without jurisdiction; and only when such facts as these
were shown would the writ issue.3 Deprivation of constitutional rights
at the time of the trial, such as the right to counsel, were classified as
jurisdictional defects for the purposes of this rule. Thus the prisoner
whose only claim is deprivation of rights subsequent to a valid trial
is subject to the objection that events occurring after a trial cannot
affect the trial court's original jurisdiction, and the writ is not the
proper remedy.4
Some, unfortunately not most, forward-looking jurists have cast
off the chains of this old rule. Witness the words of Judge Learned
Hand of the Second Circuit:
We can find no more deffinite rule than that the writ is available, not
only to determine points of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and constitutional
questions; but whenever else resort to it is necessary to prevent a com-
plete miscarriage of justice.5
A second rule, again the offspring of antiquity, declares that the
only relief a person may seek in habeas corpus proceedings is absolute
I Although in use as early as the fifteenth century, the writ began to be used
as it is today in the seventeenth century. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law
227 (3d ed. 1922).
'Hurd, Habeas Corpus 143-144 (1858).
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. [27 U.S.] 193, 203 (1830).
'See, for example, Kauble v. Haynes, 64 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
Contra: Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
'United States v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1946).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
release, and the courts are powerless to grant any other.6 It is quite
natural for the bench to balk at releasing from confinement one who
has been validly convicted of a crime for no other reason than that
prison authorities have not properly conducted themselves in regard
to his rights. Accordingly, courts often refuse to allow the prisoner
by this writ to raise such questions as the validity of a transfer from
one institution to another,7 improper medical treatment s and the like.
However, the Supreme Court has discarded this limitation on the writ,
contrary to earlier dicta,9 and now grants relief to fit the wrong,
seemingly because of the inadequacy or nonexistence of other possible
remedies. 0
A. Constitutional Grounds
The harshness of results under the historical view is most apparent
where the facts alleged by the petitioner would constitute a denial of
constitutional rights, and where habeas corpus is the only available
device to present these facts to the court. We turn first to these cases.
Often a prisoner will allege that he has been denied an opportunity
to appeal his conviction. While due process does not require a state
to provide appeal procedure," where such a procedure does exist the
equal protection clause requires that it be offered indiscriminately.12
Accordingly, where prison officials prohibited a prisoner from sending
out appeal papers, the Supreme Court held that he had been denied
equal protection.13 It was reasoned that the state statutes allowed per-
sons outside of prison to have access to the courts to appeal trial court
decisions, and that the state ought not to be allowed to delimit the
operation of these setatutes to a particular class at the whim of prison
'McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). Also see Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d
718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944).
United States v. Ragen, 152 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1945).
B Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944).9 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
"
0Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951). Also see Mahler v. Ehy, 264 U.S. 32
(1924), which cites numerous other cases before the date of the McNally
decision where the Court, in habeas corpus proceedings, granted relief other
than immediate release.
11Kohl v. Lehlback, 165 U.S. 293 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S.
655 (1895).
" Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
See Note, 19 A.L.R.2d (1951), for a thorQugh analysis of the cases concerning
habeas corpus on grounds of denial of the right to appeal.
1"Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255
(1942). Also see United States v. Ragen, 143 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1944);
Briggs v. White, 32 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1929); Bernard v. Warden of Md. House
of Correction, 187 Md. 273, 49 A.2d 737 (1946); Ex parte Rider, 50 Cal. App.
797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920). In Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal. 1949),
the prosecuting attorney kept appeal papers sent to him by a prisoner until
after the time limit for appeals ran out. The court held that such act by a
state official amounted to a denial of appeal reviewable in habeas corpus
proceedings.
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officials. Some courts, while not permitting a denial of appeal to be
raised in habeas corpus proceedings, have pointed out that the prisoner
has an opportunity to perfect a delayed appeal, thus removing the
necessary factor of discrimination.1 4
Following the theory that an appeal procedure is not a necessary
element of due process, the majority holds that denial of counsel for
purposes of appeal is likewise not violative of due process and thus
affords no ground for habeas corpus."; Where the denial of counsel
occurs during trial (clearly depriving the accused of the "fair" trial
guaranteed by due process), the by-product of which is the denial of
an appeal, the courts have sometimes talked about the denial of
appeal as well as denial of counsel when issuing the writ., However,
none of these decisions granted habeas corpus solely on the grounds
of the denial of appeal.
The courts in these denial-of-appeal cases have not strait-jacketed
themselves with the rule requiring an unconditional order of release,
but have taken a more common sense approach to the cases. Where
a prisoner had been prohibited by prison officials from sending out
appeal papers, the Supreme Court ordered release of the prisoner only
on the condition that the state should fail to provide him with an
opportunity for a delayed appeal.'7 Other courts have used the hearing
provided by the habeas corpus proceeding to allow the prisoner to
air his objections to the original trial, and have ruled upon the validity
of the trial court's holding-in short, substituting the habeas corpus
hearing for the appeal.18
Even though a person stands validly convicted and committed, at
times he has been granted a writ because he has been forced to endure
cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of prison officials. 19 Since
"State v. Howard, 224 Ind. 107, 65 N.E.2d 55, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842
(1946); Bernard v. Warden of Md. House of Correction, 187 Md. 273, 49 A.2d 737
(1946). Query whether this is still the practice in Maryland; see Holliday v.
Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 80 A.2d 608 (Md. App. 1951); Edmonson v. Warden
of Md. House of Correction, 194 Md. 707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949).
11 Brown v. Johnston, 126 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 27 (1942);
De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1939); Bernard v. Warden of Md.
House of Correction, 187 Md. 273, 49 A.2d 737 (1946). Contra: Reid v. Sanford,
42 F. Supp. 300 (D.C. Ga. 1941) (The rationale of this case was that although
the trial court had jurisdiction in the first instance, it lost it by the refusal to
appoint counsel, upon request, after it had granted the appeal.).
1 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (containing language to the effect
that denial of counsel for purposes of an appeal would be violative of due
process); Counsel v. Clemmer, 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Ex parte Cook,
84 Okla. Crim. 404, 183 P.2d 595 (1947).
17 Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
I" Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Stidham v. Swope, 82 F.
Supp. 931 (D. Cal. 1949); Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Sup. 300 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
1 See, for example, Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949).
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most state constitutions contain provisions prohibiting cruel and un-
usual punishment, a state court could protect the prisoner from such
punishment if it so desired.20 In addition to this protection is that offer-
ed by the Eighth Amendment prohibition which, when the punishment
is so cruel and unusual as to "shock the conscience," will be read into
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.21
Where habeas corpus proceedings involving the ground of cruel
and unusual punishment have been before the Supreme Court, it has
by inference sanctioned this as a ground for issuance of the writ.22 In
these cases the writ has ultimately been denied either on the ground
that the punishment was not in fact cruel and unusual, or on the
technical argument that the petitioner had not first exhausted his state
remedies before going into the federal courts. However, the inference
is possible because the Court, while refusing the writ because of non-
exhaustion, failed to advise the petitioner that even if he had exhausted
his state remedies he would have no cause of action. The federal courts
have assumed that the Supreme Court did not mean to deny that the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment was grounds for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus.23
Many difficulties face a petitioner who attempts habeas corpus
on this ground, however. Since it is difficult to prove that any punish-
ment meets the cruel and unusual test, many prisoners trip and fall
at this first hurdle.24 The law here is further clouded because most
habeas corpus petitions are drawn by the unskilled prisoner without
the aid of an attorney, and in his anxiety to present just cause for the
writ he is apt to color the facts, even to the extent of putting into his
petition completely groundless claims. One gets the impression from
reading the cases in which prisoners have made a completely un-
"
0Neb. Const. Art. 1, § 9.
" See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952) (especially see dissenting
opinion by Douglas); cf. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947). Also
see authorities cited in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
" Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952). The Court held that the petitioner
had to exhaust his state remedies in the state in which he was imprisoned. The
holding settled the dispute over the extradition cases.
1 See, for example, Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950). This
was the near universal opinion after the controversey raised by the reversal
without written opinion of Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, rev'd, 338 U.S. 864
(1949). The Court reversed, merely citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
Also see Smith v. O'Grady, 311 U.S. 633 (1940).
- State v. Smith, 114 Neb. 653, 209 N.W. 630 (1926) (bread and water diet);
Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Ala. 1951) (jail in which petitioner was
held was a serious fire hazard); In re Pinaire, 46 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Tex. 1942)
(cold pack treatment for insanity); Ex parte Berry, 113 Cal. App.2d 613, 248 P.2d
420 (1932) (medical test for syphilis); Ex parte Thompson, 32 Tex. Rep. 274,
22 S.W. 876 (1893) (refusal to allow prisoner to work off debt for which he
was imprisoned).
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supported claim of cruel and unusual punishment, usually merely
tacking it on to the real grounds for which they seek the writ, that
the court summarily denies that such punishment is grounds for the
writ without giving it the consideration possibly available if the
petitioner had supported his claim with proofs. 25
A sizeable number of cases deal with allegations of general un-
authorized acts by prison officials, wherein there is no claim, or at
least none-mentioned, that the treatment amounts to constitutionally
prohibited cruel and unusual punishment.26  The leading case grant-
ing the writ for "mere" unauthorized acts as distinguished from in-
fringements of constitutional rights is Coffin v. Reichard,27 in which
the court said:
Any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired into on
habeas corpus .... This rule applies although a person is in lawful
custody. His conviction and incarceration deprive him only of such
liberties as the law has ordained he shall suffer for his transgressions.
However, this is the minority view. 28 The majority of courts refuse
to issue the writ on one of three grounds: either of the two ancient rules
mentioned earlier-habeas corpus looks only to jurisdiction of the trial
court,29 and habeas corpus may only be used when the facts justify
complete release of the prisoner 3°-or the favorite, that the court
won't superintend "administrative functions," such as matters of dis-
cipline in the prison.31 Courts in some jurisdictions, while denying a
writ of habeas corpus, have pointed out an administrative remedy
available to the prisoner.32 In the absence of such appeal to an ad-
ministrative body, However, a prisoner in the majority of states would
probably have no chance to have these grievances heard.
22 See Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Thorp v. Clarke, 67 F.
Supp. 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1946), where allegations of cruel and unusual punishment,
unsupported by any proof, were held to be insufficient grounds for issuance
of the writ.
26 Shepard v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1947) (physical mistreatment);
Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944) (poor
food and improper dental and medical treatment); United States v. Skeen,
107 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. W. Va. 1952) (unreasonable prison regulations); Lessner
v. Humphrey, 89 F. Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (wrongful revocation of good
time); State v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 195 Md. 700, 82 A.2d 700 (1950)
(denial of right to attend church).
27 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944)
21 See Comment, 2 J. of Pub. Law 181 (1953).
-2 Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944).
2 0Kauble v. Haynes, 64 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
21 Sarshick v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Skeen,
107 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. W. Va. 1952); State v. Wright, 188 Md. 192, 51 A.2d 668
(1947).
Lessner v. Humphrey, 89 F.Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950); State v. Warden
of Md. Penitentiary, 195 Md. 700, 72 A.2d 700 (1950); State v. Warden of Md.
Penitentiary, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d 753 (1948).
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The only cases arising in Nebraska involving alleged mistreat-
ment by prison officials subsequent to a valid trial concern the claim
of unwarranted detention in solitary confinement. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has consistently. held that such allegations do not
state grounds for issuance of the writ.33 It is apparent from these
opinions that the Court based its holdings on all three of the suggested
reasons.
It stands as a tribute to Nebraska penal authorities that a case has
never arisen in this state considering after-trial deprivation of con-
stitutional rights; that is, denial of the opportunity to appeal or official
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. The fact of correct penal
administration which may thus be inferred is a fortunate thing, for
even without cases directly in point, certain factors indicate that the
judicial arm of this state's government would deny a prisoner even the
chance to have such objections heard in habeas corpus proceedings.
In the first place, the Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper method to get a hearing
upon an alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights up to the
time of sentencing. 34 The Court's position was crystallized in the
famous Hawk cases where it said that habeas corpus was not the proper
method for raising objections to an unconstitutional deprivation of
counsel at time of trial.35 Although the Court neglected to say in
definite terms which remedy should be used, an extremely important
point because of the exhaustion principle, 0 it appears that a motion
for new trial37 and subsequent writ of error 3s is the proper method.39
11 In re Application of Dunn, 150 Neb. 669, 35 N.W.2d 673 (1949); Swanson v.
Jones, 151 Neb. 767, 39 N.W.2d 557 (1949); In re Application of Bortles, 150
Neb. 679, 35 N.W.2d 679 (1949).
1 Truman v. Hann, 154 Neb. 501, 48 N.W.2d 418 (1951); In re Application of
Tail, 145 Neb. 268, 16 N.W.2d 161 (1944); Alexander v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 645,
290 N.W. 718 (1940); Darling v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 829, 235 N.W. 582 (1931).
Contra: In re Resler, 115 Neb. 335, 212 N.W. 765 (1927).
11 Hawk v. Olsen, 145 Neb. 306, 16 N.W.2d 181 (1944), on rehearing, 146 Neb.
875, 22 N.W.2d 136 (1946).
1 It can hardly be denied that a prisoner should know with certainty what
his proper remedy is, where the court has a principle which forces him to
choose the proper remedy before he can get a hearing on the merits.
"' The application for new trial must be made within ten days after the
verdict is rendered or within three years of the judgment, when on grounds
of newly discovered evidence; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2103 (Reissue 1948).
11 The time limit for commencing proceedings for writ of error is three
months after the rendition of the judgment; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1931, 29-2301,
29-2306 (Reissue 1948), as construed by Goodman v. State, 131 Neb. 662, 269
N.W. 383 (1936).
11 Hawk v. Olsen, 146 Neb. 875, 881, 22 N.W.2d 136, 140 (1946) ("The question
which petitioner now seeks to present could have been presented and determin-
ed by the trial court, in the first instance, on a motion for a new trial and if
not determined there to his liking then by this court on a writ of error." The
court failed to continue and say that this was the general rule to be applied in
all of these cases.).
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The probable reasons for the Nebraska position are (1) habeas
corpus may not be used as a substitute for writ of error, the feeling
being that events happening at the time of the trial may be appealed,
and (2) failure by the accused seasonably to demand counsel (or sup-
posedly any other constitutional right), whether or not such failure
was due to ignorance, 40 may be taken as implied waiver of the right.
It is evident therefore that these cases do not stand for the proposition
that after-trial infringement of constitutional rights is not a proper
ground for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. By definition they
happen after the trial and would thus not be a basis for appealing.the
trial court's decision. However, these cases show that the Nebraska
Court appears unperturbed by the fact that a prisoner may never have
a hearing "on the merits" concerning his claimed loss of constitutional
rights. This, plus the fact that the court has tenaciously adhered to
the rule that habeas corpus may only be used to release a prisoner
where his sentence is absolutely void for want of jurisdiction,41 are
indications that the Court would be unimpressed by such after-trial
objections.
A final factor tending to bar the granting of a habeas corpus hearing
upon allegations of after-trial deprivation of constitutional rights is
the Nebraska statute providing when a writ of habeas corpus shall
issue. This statute42 provides that all persons are entitled to the writ
who are "confined in any jail" or "unlawfully deprived" of their
liberty, ". . . except persons convicted of some crime or offense for
which they stand committed .... " Under the plain meaning of this
section it would seem that the writ is not available to any one convict-
ed and imprisoned for a crime in Nebraska.43 However, by judicial
interpretation in In re Application of Dunn4 4 the Nebraska Court
failed to adopt this literal interpretation, so that the exception in effect
reads ". . . except persons validly convicted of some crime or offense
for which they stand validly committed...." Thus the Nebraska posi-
tion that habeas corpus is only available to attack a void judgment is
further strengthened. However, the effect of this particular decision
"This view seems inconsistent with Supreme Court cases which have held
that no waiver is possible unless the accused knows his constitutional rights.
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"I See, for example, Truman v. Hann, 154 Neb. 501, 48 N.W.2d 418 (1951);
Sedlacek v. Greenholtz, 152 Neb. 386, 41 N.W.2d 154 (1950). See Jackson v.
Olsen, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946); for a review of other Nebraska
cases.
'
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2801 (Reissue 1948).
"Under this interpretation, it would seem that the statute suspends the
writ of habeas corpus in violation of the Nebraska and federal constitutions.
See Neb. Const. Art. 1, § 8; U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9. It is interesting to note that
to date Shepard's Nebraska Citator lists only six Nebraska cases which have
ever cited the statute.
"150 Neb. 669, 35 N.W.2d 673 (1949).
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is in doubt since the court in the Dunn case, after interpreting the
statute so that it could not hear the case, went ahead and discussed the
merits of the petitioner's claim of after-trial unauthorized conduct.
B. Non-Constitutional Grounds
The courts have allowed habeas corpus in a variety of other situa-
tions where the acts or circumstances complained of arise subsequent
to a valid trial. Again, petitioners in all these classes of cases have in
some jurisdictions felt the still youthful bite of the twice-mentioned
"ancient" rules. Many courts again have in some instances refused
to interfere with prison officials and have thus denied an application
for the writ, labeling the complained-of conduct as an "administrative
function."
The holdings are fairly unanimous that where a prisoner can show
that he has served the amount of time for which he was sentenced,
but has not been released, he may be released through habeas corpus.45
These cases extend this view to the allowance of statutory good time
deductions.4 6 There are no cases in Nebraska squarely in point, but
by dictum47 and inference 8 the cases indicate that the Nebraska
Supreme Court would follow the majority and allow habeas corpus
here. These holdings are in harmony with the ancient rule that habeas
corpus is available only when the trial court is without jurisdiction,
since the authority of the court over the prisoner would end when
his legal sentence ended.
The courts are even more unanimous in their refusal to issue the
writ where the prisoner claims that he has been unlawfully transferred
from one penal institution to another 4 9 This seems to be another
of the administrative functions with which the courts will not inter-
fere. 0 Under Nebraska statutes,51 when an inmate of the men's
reformatory is classified as an "incorrigible" by the institution's
11 Carroll v. Squier, 136 F.2d 571 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 793 (1943);
Cox v. McConnell, 80 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1925); McPike v. Zerbst, 21 F. Supp.
961 (N.D. Ga. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 97 F.2d 253 (1938).
11 Carroll v. Squier, 136 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 793
(1943) ("When the good time allowance, the granting of which, in the first
instance, is in the nature of a privilege bestowed by the legislature, is earned,
it becomes a matter of right, enforceable by habeas corpus proceedings.").
'
11 In re Fanton, 55 Neb. 703, 76 N.W. 447 (1898).
48 Gamron v. Jones, 148 Neb. 645, 28 N.W.2d 403 (1947); Kuwitzky v.
O'Grady, 135 Neb. 466, 282 N.W. 396 (1938).
"1 State v. Howard, 224 Ind. 515, 69 N.E.2d 172 (1946); United States v.
Ragen, 152 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1945); People v. Murphy, 257 App. Div. 1020, 12
N.Y.S.2d 870 (3d Dep't 1939).
"State v. Howard, 224 Ind. 515, 69 N.E.2d 172 (1946); Pople v. North, 91
Misc. 616, 155 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1915).
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-459 (Reissue 1950). The statute does not expressly
provide for a hearing, but an interview with Board of Control officials indicated
that a hearing is given the prisoners before any transfer is made.
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officials, he may, after a hearing before the Board of Control, be trans-
ferred to the state penitentiary. Such transfer automatically revokes
previously earned good time. Since this involves a deprivation of
substantial rights of the prisoners, New York, with a similar statute,
has held that where the transfer was made without a hearing there
was a lack of due process and the prisoner could, through habeas
corpus proceedings, get a court order re-transferring him.52 A federal
prisoner has the same right to a hearing under federal statutes.
5 3
Although there are no Nebraska cases on the subject, the rule in other
jurisdictions seems to be that even after a hearing has been given,
habeas corpus is still available to challenge the validity of the trans-
fer.54 The petitioner must in such a case assume the difficult burden
of showing that the prison authorities acted "arbitrarily, capriciously
or fraudulently."5 5  The lack of cases makes it uncertain whether
habeas corpus is available in Nebraska where no hearing is given, or
when there is one, to challenge the findings. However, if it be true
that the writ may not be used to rectify post-trial infringement of
constitutional rights, the same reasons would apply even more strongly
to bar issuance of the writ in these transfer cases.
There is a division of opinion among the jurisdictions on the issue
of whether an unwarranted revocation of parole, made without a hear-
ing, is sufficient cause for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.50
Many of the cases turn on the wording of state statutes especially con-
cerning the amount of discretion given the officer who revokes the
parole.57 Those cases arising in jurisdictions with no statute on point
appear fairly evenly split on the fundamental issue of whether or
not a right to notice and hearing before revocation of parole is guar-
anteed by the constitutional right to due process. s However, the
majority of the decisions from jurisdictions with a statute such as Ne-
braska's,5 9 where the Pardon Board has the power "... to retake and
reimprison any inmate . . . upon parole at any time, with or without
cause . . . ," hold that the statute may be -followed with impunity
"People v. Martin, 289 N.Y. 471, 46 N.E.2d 890 (1943). The New York
statute, like Nebraska's, does not expressly provide for the hearing. Due
process provides this requirement.
" Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Griffin v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d
805 (10th Cir. 1936); Lessner v. Humphrey, 89 F. Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
" See, for example, the cases cited supra note 53.
"Lessner v. Humphrey, 89 F.Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950); State v. Wright,
188 Md. 192, 51 A.2d 668 (1947).
" See cases cited Note, 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1079-92 (1953).
17 See Note, 29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953), at page 1116 for a listing of the states
which have statutes expressly providing for notice and hearing; and page 1125
for the states with a statute similar to Nebraska's, dispensing with notice and
hearing.
' See cases cited Note, 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1079-92 (1953).
9Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2623 (Reissue 1948).
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against constitutional objections raised by the inmate 0° Here the
Nebraska prisoner has neither judicial nor administrative means of
forcing a hearing on his claim that his liberty on parole was un-
justifiably revoked.61
A petition for writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been recog-
nized as the proper method for one who has been committed by court
order to an institution for the insane, who is refused release and claims
to have regained his sanity. 2 Nebraska statutes specifically provide
for the use of habeas corpus by one claiming regained'sanity. 3 Al-
though the statutes seem never to have been used by one committed
as insane in a criminal prosecution, the statute would presumably
apply as well here as in a civil committment.
II. Coram Nobis
One of the better definitions of the writ of error coram nobis was
given in New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Willicutts:
In modern practice, the writ of error coram nobis may be defined as
a common law writ issuing out of a court of record to review and correct
a judgment of its own relating to some error in fact as opposed to
error in law not appearing on the face of the record, unknown at the time
without fault to the court and to the parties seking relief, but for which
judgment would not have been entered. 64
It is seen from this that the courts have in the past considered coram
nobis to be a device which operates only to attack a judgment. It has
been thought to be axiomatic that the writ would not lie where there
was a valid judgment entered.
The kind of treatment incurred by a prisoner after sentencing has
been accepted as grounds for coram nobis where that treatment was
authorized by the judgment and at the same time contrary to law.
In the days of slavery it was held to lie to release a slave imprisoned
in the state penitentiary, slaves not being subject to such imprison-
" Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911) (under earlier statute
from which it was inferred that no hearing was needed); Ex parte Paquette,
112 Vt. 441, 27 A.2d 129 (1942); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 246 Pac. 1009
(1915).
"In Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 598, 131 N.W. 914, 915 (1911), the court
said: "Any other construction of the law would not be a kindness to the in-
mates of the penitentiary; for, if the governor is given to understand that
every time he grants a parole he thereby restores the convict to full citizenship
to such an extent that he cannot revoke such parole except upon notice and a
full hearing, he would be very loath to exercise the humane prerogative which
the code now confers upon him."
" Ex parte Rosier, 133 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Senager v. Gillham, 278 Ill.
295, 116 N.W. 71 (1917); Northfoss v. Welch, 116 Minn. 62, 133 N.W. 82 (1911).
Also see Comment, 38 Va. L. Rev. 91 (1952).
" Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-343 (Reissue 1950).
" 555 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Minn. 1931).
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ment 65 It has also been allowed to release a person under eighteen
years of age from the penitentiary for the same reason.6
But the usual case of post-trial deprivation of rights seems clearly
outside the ambit of operation of the writ. The treatment which is
complained of is not authorized by the judgment, which is therefore
not under attack. One case exists in which the writ was sought on
the grounds that the petitioner had not been able to prosecute his ap-
peal within, the statutory period. The court refused to grant the writ,
stating, "The unvarying test of the writ coram nobis is mistake or lack
of knowledge in facts inhering in the judgment itself. It has never
been granted to relieve from consequences arising subsequent to the
judgment. '67  On the other hand, it has been suggested by way of dic-
tum that the writ might lie for a person who has become insane during
his sentence in prison. 8
Nebraska has the writ of coram nobis as part of its criminal pro-
cedure, and the few cases dealing with its scope have been treated else-
where.0 9 The definition of the writ is substantially the same as that
set out above.70 While no case has been found in which the writ was
sought for anything which happened subsequent to the trial, and
while it seems unlikely that the writ would ever be granted in such
a case, it might be necessary for a mistreated prisoner to go through
the formality of seeking the writ if the state courts would allow him
no relief, and it was necessary to seek the protection of the federal
courts. It is well established that a state prisoner must exhaust all
his state remedies before the federal courts will interfere.7 1 By this
is meant that any procedure remotely possible of succeeding must be
tried. And since no square holding exists in which the writ was
denied, it seems probable that the federal courts would remain in-
active until it was tried.7
2
Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 661 (1848).
66Ex parte Gray, 77 Mo. 160 (1882).
e Collins v. State, 66 Kan. 201, 71 Pac. 251 (1903).
o Mitchell v. State, 179 Miss. 814, 176 So. 743 (1937).
Orfield, Criminal Law-Applicability of Writ of Error Coram Nobis in
Nebraska-An Addendum, 11 Neb. L. Bull. 421 (1933); Note, 19 Neb. L. Bull.
150 (1940).
"° "The object of the writ is to bring into the record, before the court that
rendered the judgment, facts which were unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial through no lack of reasonable diligence on his part, which, if
known at the time of the trial, would have resulted in a different judgment."
Hawk v. Olson, 145 Neb. 306, 310, 16 N.W.2d 181, 183 (1944).
" Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
1- See, for example, Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946), in which
the fact that the statute of limitations had plainly run was held insufficient
to excuse petitioner from trying a statutory substitute for coram nobis so as
to have completely exhausted his state remedies.
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III. Miscellaneous Remedies
A. Injunction and Mandamus
Other remedies less archaic in application suggest themselves. Why
not allow the prisoner to obtain an injunction restraining penal officials
from continuing the objectionable practice? There seem to be two rea-
sons why this is not done. First, general rules of equity prohibit the
courts from issuing an injunction in these cases. Equity does not
generally interfere in the execution of criminal sentences;73 and it is
quite uniform that equity will not restrain threatened injury to per-
sonal rights.74 Second, courts have a natural distaste for interfering
with the administration of a penal institution.75 And so the remedy
is unavailable.7 6
It has been suggested by way of dicta that a writ of mandamus
might lie where the administrative officials refuse to correct an abuse of
a prisoner's right when it has been called to their attention.77 In
addition, a California state court issued mandamus where the co-
operation of state penal officials was necessary for a prisoner to per-
fect an appeal of his conviction.7 8 The weight of authority is other-
wise, however,79 and the infrequency of its use is indicative of the non-
availability of this remedy.
B. Suit for Damages
A tort action for damages is probably the prisoner's principal form
of redress.8 0 But one who attempts to invoke this type of relief is
beset with many difficulties. Civil death statutes may prohibit the
suit from being brought until the prospective plaintiff has been re-
leased from prison or may prevent the prisoner from appearing in per-
son to present his case."' Such delay is of great importance in that
testimony and evidence become stale, and the deterrent effect of such
suits is largely lost. The prisoner may also be forced to sue a lesser
McClintock, Equity 428 (1936).
"McClintock, Equity 426 (1936).
"I See, for example, Thorp v. Clarke, 67 F. Supp. 703, 704 (D.C.N.H. 1946):
"It is not the function of this court to superintend the treatment of prisoners
in the State Prison...."
" Cf. Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
"'United States v. Ragen, 152 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1945): "Even though peti-
tioner were transferred wrongfully he is not entitled to a discharge . . . the
most he could accomplish would be a return to ... Joliet."8 Ex parte Robinson, 112 Cal.2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (1952).
7" Illustrative cases are Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
State v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 72 A.2d 700 (1950); Platek v. Aderhold,
73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934).
11 See Note, 59 Yale L.J. 800 (1950), dealing with physical mistreatment
only.
11 See Note, 26 So. Calif. L. Rev. 425 (1953).
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official, which may be financially unsatisfactory, 2 because the ranking
officials have been granted an immunity. Practical difficulties also
exist. The prisoner's only witnesses are probably other convicts, who
a jury is likely to disbelieve, and who may fear that they will have to
answer for their testimony when returned to prison.
Where the prisoner claims an infringement of his Federal Con-
stitutional rights, it is theoretically possible for him to bring suit under
the Civil Rights Act. Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
state . . ., subjects . . . any .. person ... to the deprivation of any
rights secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party in-
jured ... .,"83 But theory differs from practice, and no case has been
found in which a prisoner was successful in an action pursuant to
this statute.
C. Contempt
It may be possible for a prisoner to invoke the contempt powers of
the court in order to protect his rights. Two cases, one in a federal
district court 4 and one in a state supreme court, have held that a
pers6n in charge of prisoners who violates their rights is guilty of
contempt of court.8 5 It is reasoned that the jailor is ex officio an
officer of the court in that he carries out its criminal judgments; that
he has been ordered to "receive and safely keep" the prisoner; and
that when he does not do this the court may punish him by using
its inherent powers.
This theory has sometimes been adhered to where excessive leniency
by the jailor is alleged instead of mistreatment. It has been held that
a jailor may be held in contempt if he prematurely releases the
prisoner s" or if he accords him special privileges ST Logic would seem
to dictate in these jurisdictions that irregular conduct by the jailor
is punishable as contempt no matter whether it works for the prisoner's
benefit or against it, but apparent difficulty exists in trying to convince
a court that implicit in the commitment's order to "receive and safely
keep" is a mandate not to abuse the prisoner.
D. Nebraska Law
Few of these remedies have been resorted to in Nebraska. There
is no reported case of a prisoner ever having sought an injunction or
"For example, Gentry v. Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85 (1947);
Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693 (1948).
83 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1940), now transferred to 42 U.S.C.A:.
§ 1983 (1953).
"In re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
"' Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237 Pac. 203 (1925). A Colorado case is con-
tra, People v. District Court, 89 Co. 78, 299 Pac. 1 (1931), and the case may
not even be good law in Arizona anymore. See Ridgway v. Superior Court of
Yavapai County, 74 Ariz. 117, 245 P.2d 268 (1952).8 State v. Superior Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 Pac. 1033 (1926).
"United States v. Hoffman, 13 F.2d 269 (N.D. Ill. 1925).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
writ of mandamus. Suit for damages has been brought against a
sheriff based on his negligence in allowing a jail to burn,8 but no
litigation has been found where intentional abuse of a prisoner was
alleged as a cause of action. The Nebraska courts have mentioned the
contempt power as a possible sanction, but have neither approved nor
disapproved of it.8 9 And so, especially in view of the holdings in other
jurisdictions, there seems to be no remedy available to the Nebraska
prisoner which is certain to afford him some relief.
% CONCLUSION
There is apparently no satisfactory judicial procedure by which a
prisoner who has been validly tried and convicted can get redress for
wrongs done him while in prison. Several remedies have been sug-
gested, habeas corpus being the most prominent. The use of this writ,
however, has been severely curtailed by judicial inertia which refuses
to yield to pressing problems and instead clings to archaic limitations
to its application.
Of the other remedies to which resort has been made, none are
adequate. Coram nobis by definition is inapplicable, and mandamus
or an injunction will not issue. Numerous obstacles render a suit for
damages by the prisoner a hopeless procedure, and to attempt to in-
voke the contempt powers of the courts is a hap-hazard procedure at
best.
With reference to habeas corpus, Nebraska law is subject to the
same deficiencies that exist in other jurisdictions. In the area of
general unauthorized treatment which falls short of violation of a
constitutional right, the Nebraska Supreme Court has spoken in the
solitary confinement cases, holding that such disciplinary matters are
not reviewable by the courts. This stand seems justified. If the gate-
way to the judiciary is opened to claims of unwarranted discipline,
the courts would be flooded with habeas corpus petitions based upon
fancied discriminatory treatment. This same theory-non-harrass-
ment of prison officials-justifies the refusal to hear cases of un-
authorized transfer, with the possible exception of transfers from the
reformatory to the penitentiary which revoke good time. It appears
that Nebraska would follow the majority in ruling that release is pos-
sible through habeas corpus proceedings on grounds of completion of
lawful criminal sentence or regained sanity. In the non-constitutional
cases therefore, only in the latter-mentioned transfer cases and the un-
warranted revocation of parole cases does it appear that the man im-
prisoned in Nebraska may be imprisoned wrongfully, without a chance
to have a judicial hearing concerning these wrongs.
" O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W.2d 906 (1948), appeal of second
trial, 152 Neb. 290, 41 N.W.2d 123 (1950).
,1 In re Application of Dunn, 150 Neb. 669, 675, 35 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1949).
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Without doubt, if full protection of the prisoners' rights is the goal
the two inadequacies in Nebraska Law just mentioned should, in some
way, be remedied. However, this inadequacy appears slight when
compared to the plight of the prisoner who is being deprived of con-
stitutional rights after his trial. His only hope in Nebraska is through
federal habeas corpus. Where a state imprisons a person in violation
of rights guaranteed him by the federal cmnstitution, and the state
courts refuse to remedy the wrong done by the state, he may petition
the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus.90 The catch is the
phrase in italics; in language more familiar to one who has sought
federal habeas corpus for state wrongs, all state remedies must be
exhausted. The religousness with which this rule is applied is illus-
trated by this statement from a Supreme Court opinion:
Nor do the denials of petitioner's applications for habeas present a
federal question merely because the five-year statute of limitations on
the statutory substitute for the writ of error coram nobis has expired.
Petitioner claims that this leaves him without any remedy in the state
courts. But we do not know whether the state courts will construe the
statute so as to deprive petitioner of his right to challenge a judgment
rendered in violation of Constitutional guarantees where his action is
brought more than five years after rendition of the judgment.91
Thus even though the availability of a remedy in the state court is
extremely remote, the petitioner must first try it before the writ will
issue from the federal courts. Relief at the end of so circuitous a
route hardly seems any relief at all. If the Hawk case is a measuring
stick, it takes 17 years to exhaust state remedies in Nebraska. Has
justice triumphed when a man spends 17 years in prison under an
invalid sentence?
The exhaustion problem is further enhanced by the confused state
of the law on habeas corpus in this state. The Supreme Court has
charged that ". . . the opinions of the Nebraska Courts do not mark
clearly the exact bounderies within which Nebraska confines the
historic remedy of habeas corpus . ,,192 Being confused, the federal
courts must ask the Nebraska court for a determination of the issues
presented by each slight change in the facts presented by a petitioner
before they can grant a writ93 The federal courts can never say, "It
is clear that Nebraska would not issue a writ of habeas corpus for
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (Supp. 1952).
" Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
SSmithv. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 332 (1941).
"See Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), involving deprivation of the
right to counsel in a Nebraska trial court. The petitioner argued that he should
not have to try habeas corpus in the Nebraska courts before getting federal
habeas corpus. However, the court held, after making the statement cited in
note 91 supra, that since the writ might possibly be available in Nebraska, he
would have to try there for it.
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after-trial deprivation of constitutional rights. '94 The cases also
indicate that the law on coram nobis is so confused that perhaps the
petitioner will also have to try it.
Because of the delay thus occasioned, it is submitted that federal
habeas corpus, though theoretically possible, is practically inadequate
as a remedy for post-trial violations of constitutional rights. If the
government of this state is really concerned with protecting the rights
of persons imprisoned in state institutions, the enactment of an in-
dependent statutory remedy would seem to be necessary. Illinois
recently passed a Post-Conviction Hearing Act providing for a hearing
upon allegations by a prisoner that he was deprived of constitutional
rights at the time of his trial.9 5 Mr. Albert Jenner, chairman of the
committee which fostered this statutory revision, pointed out that this
act was passed as a substitute for other post-conviction remedies.9 6
The new remedy resulted in part from the United States Supreme
Court's denunciation of the confused state of Illinois decisions as to
what remedies were available in varying circumstances resulting is a
lack of due process.97 This confusion went to the basic issue of which
of the three possible remedies, i.e., habeas corpus, coram nobis, or writ
of error, should be used in cases where a man was deprived of con-
stitutional rights at his trial. The similarity to the present unhealthy
conditions in Nebraska, even to the exact remedies which are in a
state of confusion, is apparent. Thus, in a recent comment on the late
Henry Hawk's dilemma, it was suggested that Nebraska enact such a
statutory remedy for pre-committment deprivation of constitutional
rights.98 To prevent a recurrance of the Hawk case, this would seem
wise, but insufficient for the protection of the prisoner who can show
only post-trial deprivation of constitutional rights. The obvious answer
is to extend the new statutory remedy to include these post-trial acts
by prison officials. Only by the passage of such a statute may the
constitutional rights of Nebraska prisoners effectively be preserved.
Such an enactment is strongly urged.
JERROLD L. STRASHEIM, '55
DoNN E. DAvis, '54
1' It is clear that where there is an absence of an appropriate state remedy,
or where such remedy is ineffective, the federal courts may sustain an applica-
tion for the writ even though the petitioner does not first seek it in the state
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1952).
IM. Ann. Stat. tit. 38, §§ 826-832 (1936 pock. part).
11 Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. 247 (1953
pock. part).
" Marnio v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947) (concurring opinion by the late
Mr. Justice Rutledge).
"Solomon, The Judicial Obstacle Course, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 445 (1950).
